

Preventing radicalization and polarization: A literature review of policies, priorities, programs, and partnerships for youth at risk

Paul Mutsaers¹ and Sibel Demir²

¹ Fontys University of Applied Sciences, Department of Pedagogical Studies

² ContourdeTwern / R-Newt

Introduction

In December 2018, the present authors started a literature review on the challenges and opportunities for pedagogical alliances in the prevention of radicalization and polarization, with a specific interest in collaborations between school communities and youth work organizations (i.e. frontline pedagogues). The results of this review are presented below.¹

This review was commissioned by the Platform *Jeugd preventie Extremisme en Polarisation* (JEP), or "Youth prevention Extremism and Polarization", an interdepartmental collaboration in which several ministries work together to assist professionals and volunteers who work for and with youth regarding issues of polarization, radicalization and extremism. Running parallel with the literature review, two assignments were also given to and carried out by Fontys University of Applied Sciences and Amsterdam University of Applied Sciences. Together with partners in the field, researchers worked hard to get to grips with and improve local best practices in Utrecht and Tilburg, in which youth work organizations and school communities work together on radicalization and polarization issues. These local communities of practice delivered the empirical materials for the project, whereas the present authors focused on the advancement of theory and conceptual frameworks to help interpret the empirical data.

The rest of this text unfolds as follows. In the first section, *Policies and Plans*, we briefly discuss some of the developments in the policy world of radicalization, polarization and (violent) extremism, with a specific focus on prevention. This policy review is not meant to be comprehensive; we simply wish to point at certain trends. We do so by discussing the similarities and differences between security approaches, public health approaches and pedagogical approaches.

In the second part of the text, *Priorities, Programs and Partnerships*, we investigate the implications of these policy developments for the priorities, programs and partnerships that are, or ought to be explored and developed in this field. Key to this section is the distinction

¹ Initially, we used different combinations of search terms (such as "partnerships", "radicalization", "extremism", "terrorism", "polarization", "schools", "education", "youth work", "social work", "collaboration", "alliances") to discover descriptions of pedagogical alliances between schools and youth workers in the academic, applied, and professional literature, using Web of Science and Google Scholar as our main databases. However, the outcome of this search was rather disappointing. Although calls for partnership are ubiquitous, very few descriptions of extant partnerships can be found. In response, we decided to broaden our search, first by exploring policy shifts in the prevention of radicalization and polarization, to understand on what grounds such partnerships are defended. Subsequently, we looked for specific examples of interventions by frontline pedagogical professionals and explored ways forward for partnerships between these professionals.

that we make between individual, community and societal resilience in the face of polarization and radicalization. We draw on social capital theory to argue that, in addition to the enhancement of individual resilience, social bonding, bridging and linking are necessary to enhance community and societal resilience. We will discuss the importance of horizontal as well as vertical partnerships, and along the way, give examples of existing partnerships as well as suggestions for new partnerships to be forged.

Policies and plans

Political radicalism, religious fundamentalism, anti-globalism, violent extremism, Islamism, terrorism, strong religion, cognitive radicalization, behavioral radicalization, ideology-based violence; many different concepts have long been circulating to justify various strategies and policies to prevent and counter violent extremism (often abbreviated as PVE/CVE) guided by some sort of ideological or political conception of the world (e.g. Abbas 2007; Almond et al. 2003; ter Haar and Busuttill 2003; Juergensmeyer 2003; Neumann 2013). If anything, this broad range of concepts tells us something about the immense variety of strategies and policies that have appeared, disappeared and reappeared in response to the social phenomena they are meant to address. Ever since 9/11 and the ensuing polarization that destabilized the pre-9/11 world as we knew it, different responses have been formulated at political, military and societal levels and in the context of security, integration and foreign policy (Sedgwick 2010).

It is not our intention to offer a comprehensive review of all the (studies of) strategies and policies that have developed in response to the different steps on the “staircase to terrorism” (Moghaddam 2005). Others have written such reviews before and have done so at a level of excellence we could never match (e.g. Hardy 2018). Rather, our intention is to trace some trends in this particular policy world, as well as the (academic) literature that has emerged to reflect on it and help improve it. These trends are of utmost importance and it is imperative that we track and trace them, or so we will argue, because they are to be seen as a necessary counterweight to dominant security discourses and practices that, eventually, may do more harm than good.

Security-oriented approaches

Security issues are a growing public concern as they have become dominant in politics, policy and media, appearing daily and globally in media images of threats, conflict, chaos and disorder (Mutsaers 2019a). Terrorist attacks—of various sorts and sources—have a great effect on this imagery, as they belong to the category of horrific events that is typically stored in public memory for a long time. The impact of such attacks, as well as the more invisible, silent or dormant forms of radicalization that may lead up to them, has become evident from the “reactive securitization” (Maguire 2014) that came as a first response in the early and highly militarized years of counterterrorism.

But remember the days when Chris Patten, the European Union’s (EU) former commissioner for external affairs, lamented Washington’s “unilateralist urge” in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. He argued in the *Financial Times* that the military operation in Afghanistan had ‘perhaps reinforced some dangerous instincts: that the projection of military power is the only basis of true security’ (cf. Luck 2004: 74). Militarized action, especially in the absence of multilateral approval, was never accepted without a fight. But neither did it go away, as anyone living in Paris between November 2015 and November 2017 can tell. The state of emergency that was announced after the Paris attacks and lasted for two years is exemplary of the *fusion*

of *internal and external security* and the upsurge of military action in response to internal affairs (Bigo 2006). In other words, while militarized action has always been fiercely debated, it has also become more diffuse and in some way an accepted part of life in many places across the globe. The “war on terror” knows many different faces and is waged in airports, deserts, prisons as well as the back alleys of our metropolises.

One effect of this ubiquity is the hegemonic security and criminal justice focus in national antiterrorism legislation (e.g. van der Woude 2012). Citing Garland (2001), van der Woude talks of an ensuing “culture of control” characterized by a punitive mentality as well as early intervention (“risk justice”). For instance, in reaction to the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on Combating Terrorism, EU member states adapted their legal apparatuses to allow for a criminalization of jihadist (recruitment) activities. The Netherlands, for instance, signed various acts into law to deal with terrorist acts, national security vs. witness rights, and police powers, such as the *Wet terroristische misdrijven*, *Wet afgeschermede getuigen*, and the *Wet ter verruiming van de mogelijkheden tot opsporing en vervolging van terroristische misdrijven* (van der Woude 2012). These laws, however, have been fiercely criticized for their exclusionary effects. Organizations such as Amnesty International, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, the Open Society Justice Initiative, and the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights have criticized such laws for their polarizing effects (e.g. setting Muslim populations apart, enforcing social stigmas, stimulating ethnic profiling by law enforcement agencies).

Although the necessity of some security measures is indisputable, awareness has developed that a security focus may be necessary but *not* sufficient (e.g. Kundnani and Hayes 2018; San et al. 2013). More and more authorities, (legal) experts and academics seem to agree that different approaches are required to understand fundamentalism, radicalism, extremism and terrorism as *human* problems—i.e. problems that are inherently complex and fluid—and to tackle them as such. We draw upon an old anthropological work by Edmund Leach (*Custom, Law and Terrorist Violence*, 1977) when we argue that we only conjure inhuman enemies when we solely treat people as threats to be neutralized.

Public health approaches

In 2011, the Obama administration commenced its new national security policy, which is now commonly known as “countering violent extremism” (CVE). It is defined as the ‘use of non-coercive means to *dissuade individuals or groups* from mobilizing towards violence and to mitigate recruitment, support, facilitation or engagement in ideologically motivated terrorism by non-state actors in furtherance of political objectives’ (Khan 2015: n.p., italics added). The italicized part indicates the notable shift from “hard power” to “soft power”. Rather than reacting to past acts, CVE strategies target future acts by dissuading people from mobilizing towards violence.

Initially, CVE maintained a criminal justice focus in the United States, as it ‘has been predominantly conducted by law enforcement and informed by criminal justice frameworks’ (Weine et al. 2016: 2). Weine et al. (2016) conducted ethnographic research on what they call “first-wave CVE” with community policing departments in Los Angeles and Minneapolis and their engagement with communities. Despite the desired community-orientation and partnership, however, Weine (2015) concluded in a research brief that many community members perceived the CVE program as illegal surveillance and a stigmatization of Muslim Americans. These pushbacks, it is argued, should be taken into account in a “second-wave” of CVE activities that is much more focused on the prevention and intervention components of CVE (in other words: PVE) and is meant to promote inclusion of individuals and communities

at risk (Weine et al. 2016). Additionally, second-wave CVE programs and activities ought to be carried out by non-police agencies as well.

These recommendations have been put into practice elsewhere, for instance in Denmark, where the famous *Aarhus Model* finds its origin. This particular PVE/CVE program brings together a wide swathe of public, semi-public and private organizations such as the police, social services, the public youth sector, job centers and psychiatric services (Johansen 2018). These different agencies receive cases from the *InfoHouse* (manned by police and social workers), who receive “signs of radicalization” from teachers and school principals, other police officers, parents, peers, neighbors, etc. In contrast to the first-wave CVE programs in the United States, which still reminds of law & order discourse, the Aarhus Model looks more like a form of *welfare policing*, in which law enforcement partners up with the local welfare system to establish an early-warning system to spot and intervene with radicalization. Johansen (forthcoming): ‘The Aarhus Model is a brilliant example of how the Northern countries have turned counter-radicalization into an extended welfare project.’ The Aarhus strategy consists of a number of tangible efforts, such as a mentor program, psychotherapy, welfare provision in the form of housing, employment, education and counseling, and an exit program to withdraw individuals from “contagious sources”.

This last phrase is striking because it refers to a crucial point that Johansen (forthcoming) makes: the Aarhus Model approach to prevention draws on socio-epidemiological perspectives that are close to World Health Organization (WHO) models of epidemic control. In her case analyses, Johansen draws our attention to the language of epidemics used to frame suspicious signs and possible threats: “epicenters of radicalization”, “viral”, “spreading”, “isolation”, “hotspots”, and “contagion”. While Johansen seems to be somewhat critical of this approach, Weine et al (2016) actually applaud it. In their call for a second-wave of CVE, they advise policymakers and practitioners to explicitly draw on a public health framework and offer the WHO definition of public health to lead the way:

Public health refers to all organized measures (whether public or private) to prevent disease, promote health, and prolong life among the population as a whole. Its activities aim to provide conditions in which people can be healthy and focus on entire populations, not on individual patients or diseases. Thus, public health is concerned with the total system and not only the eradication of a particular disease (WHO 2016 in Weine et al. 2016: 4).

So, rather than zeroing in on particular risky “elements” in society and singling them out for law enforcement to be dealt with, as many CVE security policies do, public health approaches strive for a healthy society and focus on the prevention of unhealthiness (of various sorts) in the entire population. Weine et al (2016) argue that, although they are often linked to the spread of disease, public health policies are also concerned with the prevention of injuries, the promotion of healthy behaviors and environments, the assistance of communities in recovery and the quality and accessibility of health services. This holistic approach is enabled by the inclusion of various disciplines (psychiatry, psychology, sociology, communications, education, public policy) and builds on the diverse range of activities carried out by public health professionals (e.g. community-based programs, administering services, research and evaluation, policy recommendation). These characteristics, Weine and colleagues argue, turn public health approaches into suitable candidates for the pursuit of PVE/CVE innovations.

Public health policies differ from security policies in at least two important ways. First, as mentioned above, whereas security policies aim at “abnormal” or “risky” individuals or groups in society, public health policies prefer a much broader view of the issue at hand. For example, whereas most security professionals are mainly concerned with the deviant paths that lead people to the staircase to terrorism (recruitment infrastructures, first signs of radical

behavior, extreme activities, etc.), public health professionals are more interested in the bricks and stones of which these paths and staircases are made. In their ethnographic study of Somali Americans, for instance, Weine and Ahmed (2012) described no less than 37 risk factors at individual, family, community, state, and global levels to understand the “opportunity structures” that draw people towards radicalization as well as the “protective resources” that keep them away from it. Such structures and resources are not limited to strictly security-related issues but extend to more mundane matters such as the access that people have to social and (mental) health services, the availability of community services and activities, the fairness of the criminal justice system, safe neighborhoods, parental monitoring, family involvement in education, civic engagement, interfaith dialogue, etc. This broad orientation steers the attention away from deviant or risky individuals and towards the social environments in which these individuals lead their lives, revolving around questions such as how does the social environment injure individuals or, reversely, make them more resilient?; what resources do people need to stay away from extremism?; or how can communities recover from civil liberty violations or other polarizing events?

This broad orientation requires coordinated effort, which brings us to the second distinction between security and public health policies: partnerships. As mentioned, first-wave CVE efforts deliberately started with partnerships between law enforcement and communities. Public health policies, on the other hand, envision more extensive partnership networks in order to meet the various goals that are articulated. In the public health framework that they developed in order to redirect CVE activities, Weine et al. (2016) consistently talk of the need for numerous social, criminal justice, health, educational and community partners to share information, to organize meeting-points to train professionals in various settings, and to ‘develop a coalition of partners to help sectors integrate CVE into existing activities’ (p.7) in order to make sure countering violent extremism is part of building healthy communities and strong ties with diverse professionals.

Moreover, this multi-agency approach is a better fit with state-of-the-art knowledge of radicalization—possibly culminating in extremism or terrorism—as a highly uncertain and ambiguous process that cannot be captured by simple models of good and bad (e.g. Pruyt and Kwakkel 2014). Using an exploratory multi-model approach (three system dynamics simulation models were used to generate ensembles of plausible dynamics, which in turn were analyzed with machine-learning techniques), Pruyt and Kwakkel argue that there is a complex interplay of multiple factors and processes underlying radicalization and no certain answers to basic questions such as ‘whether or not a relation exists between radical ideas and radical actions [or] whether radical beliefs are a necessary precursor for terrorism or not’ (p.1-2). Rather than ‘massive monitoring and last-moment intervention programs focusing solely on thwarting radical actions’ (p.24), their multi-model analysis suggests that we better invest in interventions that consider the complex dynamics of radicalization and approach it contextually. That means among other things, according to Pruyt and Kwakkel, that we develop ‘the necessary mechanisms to openly express minority grievance, raise awareness, address underlying problems, and avoid radicalization due to marginalization’ (p.24).

Lessons learned

The CVE policy that the Obama administration launched in 2011 led the first wave of counter-extremism innovations, distinctly pushing the policy area towards a soft power approach. Subsequent studies, however, revealed unforeseen impacts of these CVE programs. In particular, the exclusionary effect they were having, entailed serious challenges. Several countries benefitted from the lessons learned by this first wave of CVE practices and redesigned their own methods. Social collaboration around preventing radicalization started to appear at the core of these new programs that tended to encourage the concept of a welfare system, rather than a security controlled approach. Policies of this nature have a public health focus and emphasize the necessity of social collaboration while targeting prevention.

- This means not merely looking for denominators on the assessment of potential radicals. On the contrary, as a major denominator, distortions in the social climate are carefully being studied.
- Another important difference in public health policies lies within the more extensive partnership networks in which different agencies are represented. Frameworks of this nature, therefore, produce better substantiated visions and programs.

Pedagogical approaches

Whilst public health policies mainly address radicalization and related problems as issues of health and wellbeing, pedagogical approaches prefer a more focused parental and educational lens. This quarter of the policy world is relatively new, mainly European, and quickly expanding (e.g. Aly et al. 2014; Azough 2017; Davies 2016; Gielen 2014; Macaluso 2016; Mattsson et al. 2016; McNicol 2016; O'Donnell 2017; Pels and de Ruyter 2011, 2012; San et al. 2013; Sieckelinck and de Winter 2015; Sieckelinck et al. 2015; Stephens et al. 2019).

The main qualifier that pedagogues bring to other approaches is that radicalization and subsequent processes can often be linked to the identity needs of young people (e.g. Pels and de Ruyter 2011). This link is perhaps best captured by a quote from the authoritative *Formers and Families* report: 'affiliation with a radical organization is often driven by the need of adolescents and young adults for ready-made answers with regard to identity-issues, or even a sense of kinship as a substitute for troubled family ties...' (Sieckelinck and de Winter 2015: 6). Focused on the transitional *journeys* in and out of *extremisms* (note the plural nouns; more below) in Denmark, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, the authors give much weight to the pedagogical climate within the family and the role that parents and other "educators" play in radicalization and de-radicalization processes. In earlier work, the authors had already found that this role is not easily fulfilled (van San, Sieckelinck and de Winter 2013). Parents, teachers and other educators (e.g. youth and social workers) find it hard at best to detect and counterbalance radicalization and extremism in youth, or, at worst, may even fuel these processes. *Formers and Families* as well as other studies corroborate this conclusion (e.g. Hoppenbrouwers et al. 2019).

Pedagogues are not the only group of academics noticing the overrepresentation of youth among people with extreme ideals, as other scholars have come to similar conclusions (e.g. Slootman and Tillie 2006; Weine and Ahmed 2012). Writing from an anthropological perspective, for instance, Mutsaers and van Nuenen (2018) and Mutsaers (2019b) try to understand youth *cultures of resistance* that emerge in response to police violence in the Netherlands and the United States. In *#BlackLivesMatter*, Mutsaers (2019b) sheds light on the (by now litigated) conflict between activists groups in the US and the Federal Bureau of

Investigation (FBI). Holding on to very different cultural outlooks on the world, BlackLivesMatter activists claim to be peaceful protestors, while the FBI has attached the designation “Black Identity Extremists” to them. The widening gap between these different social actors can be understood as a deteriorating “legal alienation” of the youth in question. Young activists increasingly feel that the law and its enforcers are not there for them. In pedagogical language this is a sad example of tertiary socialization gone away.

Pedagogues, however, might be better suited to elucidate the primary and secondary socialization processes (or “transitional journeys”) that can swing young people in or out of radicalism or extremism. These concern the domains of home and school. For example, Hoppenbrouwers et al. (2019) found that Muslim parents in the Netherlands worry about the risk of radicalization that their children run due to the extra burden that is put on their shoulders by the polarized society in which they grow up. Parents complain about the challenges their children face in terms of identity development and plead for collective parenting (i.e. in groups of parents that have each other’s back) by lack of support from the formal institutions. These include the schools their children attend. Some parents complained about what we can call “hyperhermeneutic” teachers, that is, teachers with ‘a compulsive need to interpret and mine just about everything for hidden meaning, to see any trivial occurrence as a sign or omen of what might come’ (Spyer 2006: 206). For example, when a child refuses to shake hands with a teacher, the next morning this is discussed in a teachers’ briefing as a first sign of radicalization. We wonder, with Van San et al. (2013: 267) if such a reactive and sometimes punitive mentality does not *push* young people ‘into a corner where they are bound to become increasingly influenced by their more extreme contemporaries’.

Hoppenbrouwers et al. (2019) found another push factor that was also mentioned in the *Formers and Families* study: detrimental parenting. This is a common problem, but one with extra complications in families with transnational features, such as the Muslim families included in the study. The teenagers and young adults that were interviewed for this project narrated to the researchers how they suffered from father absence—and not just father absence, but the instant and definite departure of the father to his country of origin. The sudden disappearance of the father figure out of the lives of youngsters was sometimes followed by severe forms of *parentification*, that is, role confusion to the degree that children take over the parenting role. Although no evidence was found in this particular sample, it is not far-fetched to think that such role confusions push youngsters to look for kinship surrogates and to find them in family-like groups headed by lionized father figures with extreme ideals. In fact, that this happens is one of the main findings in the *Formers and Families* project.

In the Netherlands, the insight that generally neither parents nor teachers are well equipped to adequately respond to the development of radical or extreme ideals in youth, has led to the assignment of a pivotal role to social professionals, especially youth workers (van de Weert and Eijkman 2018). As an important group of frontline professionals, it is argued, youth workers are ideally positioned to develop a sort of early-warning system. The proximity of youth workers and their everyday and low-profile contact with youth, allows them to help youth sort things out in an early stage of radicalization (Abdallah et al. 2016). When things nonetheless appear to spin out of control, they know how to “scale up” and refer cases to the criminal justice system.

Yet, it is too early to skip merrily off into the sunset, as practice is always more refractive than theory. In theory, youth workers are pivotal in the early detection of and intervention with radicalization, but in practice at least two problems remain. First, in their article on youth workers’ subjectivity in the detection of radicalization and violent extremism, Van der Weert and Eijkman (2018) argue that youth workers may be ideally *positioned* for monitoring and information-sharing, but often lack the *tools and knowledge* to spot signs of radicalization and extremism:

Despite training and increased knowledge, the question remains whether youth workers are sufficiently equipped to assess potential risks in youth.... The concepts of radicalization and (violent) extremism are in practice difficult to distinguish [and] the youth worker's judgment often relies more on individual perceptions rather than evidence-based criteria to identify potential "risky" persons' (p.1).

Second, the partnership between youth workers and criminal justice agencies will not always be without collateral damage. The youngsters that are targeted in this context are likely to have developed "antagonistic identities" (Van San et al. 2013) in opposition to "the establishment", "socio-political order", "powerful agents", or whatever united front, real or imagined. As the "immediate face of government" (Manning 2010), criminal justice agencies typically are perceived as part of that front, as they represent the state, the law, and the social order they protect (Mutsaers 2019a; Smith 2007). It thus needs to be considered that this partnership may do more harm than good when it delegitimizes youth work (cf. Weine et al. 2016, who, as mentioned above, made similar comments about the first-wave CVE strategies or Mattsson et al. 2016 for a critique on the securitization of the educational field).

Pedagogues have observed these trends through pained eyes, knowing that a radical turn is needed in our policies concerning youth radicalization and related processes. Such policies start with a different ontology that allows us to understand that the development of strong ideals in young people may be part of the normal development of political ideas (Van San et al 2013). When taking place in a sound and constructive pedagogical and educational environment, this development may even be conducive of critical citizenship (ibid). What is required, therefore, is coordinated effort that also involve various other parties and platforms, such as parents, teachers, and youth workers, sacred sites, homes, schools, community centers and the internet.

Lessons learned

Today's researches have started to see a clearer correlation between radicalization and the need for identity development. For this reason, when dealing with deradicalization or anti-radicalization, a significant role is assigned to both formal and informal educators, such as mentors and parents.

- This is a major challenge due to attached tasks, which may demand efforts beyond the capabilities of educators. Moreover, social waves, for instance, in youth cultures may possibly be of notable influence, as well as polarized societies that can exert severe pressure.

While young people (at risk) may feel targeted by authorities, they do have a relationship of trust with youth workers who are close to the world in which they live. It is, therefore, argued that youth workers have a unique and ideal position both in early-warning and prevention of radicalization.

- This unique as well as vulnerable position requires of cross-sectoral collaboration additional prudence in reliable operational frameworks.

Priorities, programs and partnerships

We opened the previous section by stating that the myriad ways of framing the various steps on the "staircase to terrorism" reflect the wide array of policies and strategies that have been developed in response to them. We categorized these into security, public health and pedagogical approaches to make sense of some of the main trends in this field of governance

and to argue that the momentum of security approaches has crested. New preventive approaches have emerged that question the validity, effectiveness and appropriateness of security approaches on various grounds. These need to be summarized before we can continue mindfully with a discussion of the various priorities, programs and partnerships that flow from these new approaches.

First, advocates of security approaches may be caught in a web of “wicked problems” that they themselves have spun (e.g. de Graaff 2016). Such problems may only become worse instead of less due to the solutions that are offered for amelioration. The more security agents detect and detain “risky elements” in society, the more frustration and alienation may occur in particular communities that feel “over-policed” and “under-protected” as a result (Mutsaers 2019). In the long run, this may fuel rather than counter radicalism and extremism².

Second, security approaches may miss the mark with their overt focus on the “abnormality” of individuals or groups. Public health advocates, instead, prefer to focus on the abnormality of conditions (poverty, exclusion, unemployment, failing infrastructures, etc.) and pedagogues on the “normality” of the prevalence of radical ideas and ideals in the minds of youngsters. If properly guided, these may become a steppingstone to sound and critical citizenship. The involvement of security actors in pedagogical alliances or other forms of partnerships may thus pose a risk in the sense that they can delegitimize such partnerships. When youngsters perceive prevention in the public health or pedagogical sphere as “prepression” (Schinkel 2011) due to the involvement of security actors, these youngsters may backtrack from initially promising interventions (see also Bonte 2016). (We will argue below that, in order to prevent such scenarios, security and non-security actors must become equal partners).

Finally, this involvement of security actors in such partnerships can especially become a liability when these actors hold on to a fallacious “groupist thinking” (Brubaker 2002). The initial UK Prevent strategy is a case in point. Prevent has been an important element of the UK government’s counter-extremism strategy since 2006. It is a multi-agency approach, including health, education and social services, but with ‘the realisation of a specific policing, security and intelligence mandate to engage in overt and covert counterterrorism measures to establish counternarrative schemes as part of the communication and information battle’ (Abbas 2018: 5). It has been argued that Prevent can ‘unintentionally add to *structural* and *cultural* Islamophobia, which are amplifier of both Islamist and far right radicalisation’ (ibid: 1, italics original). Although it has been noted that “progressive iterations” of Prevent have attempted to address some of these issues (cf. Aly et al. 2014), the worry remains that Prevent is centered on Muslims. In the summary of a report by the UK House of Commons (Communities and Local Government Committee) we can read that the committee agrees

...with the majority of witnesses that *Prevent* risks undermining positive cross-cultural work on cohesion and capacity building to combat exclusion and alienation in many communities... The single focus on Muslims in *Prevent* has been unhelpful. We conclude that any programme which focuses solely on one section of a community is stigmatizing, potentially alienating, and fails to address the fact that no section of a population exists in isolation from others. The need to address extremism of all kinds on a cross-community basis, dependent on assessed local risk, is paramount (Communities and local Government Committee 2010: n.p.)

² The counterargument would be that society is best protected if an actual risk is put behind bars, but that argument does not take into account the carceral condition and its potential wildfire effects on radicalization (although prison does not necessarily have to be the breeding ground of radicalism it is considered to be in the sometimes hysterical media; cf. Fassin 2015, 2017).

Despite some differences, advocates of public health and pedagogical policies are united in their response to these issues (securitized insecurity, legitimacy problems and groupist thinking). Rather than focusing on the criminalized and securitized abnormalities of (groups of) people, they give primacy to understanding what it is that makes people *resilient* in the face of adversity and hardship; a concept that is often used to understand what it is that enables people to achieve successful outcomes in negative circumstances (Aly et al. 2014; Stephens et al. 2019). The theory and practice of resilience are given top priority in these fields, as resilience is now considered key in providing 'the basis for a common framework for prevention' (Stephens et al. 2019: 1). This has led to a much more positive agenda that does not ask what is wrong with people, but what is right with them—and with the circumstances in which they live (more below). In risk-management language, the focus does not so much rest on “risk” factors as it does on “protective” and “promotive” factors that protect people from harm and promote resilience. Some questions that revolve around this focus on resilience are for instance: “what socio-cognitive resources keep youngsters protected from the moral disengagement that is often encouraged in extremist groups?”, “what social, cultural and political resources enhance democratic agency in youth?”, or “how can institutions keep youngsters from marginalization and isolation in polarized times?”. Such questions are emphatically *not* group-specific and concentrate on what is supportive rather than degrading.

The focus on strengths rather than deficits is attractive to scholars and policy-makers alike. No wonder that the literature on resilience is now booming. It has branched off in various directions, including literature on children, youth and families across cultures (e.g. Ungar 2008; Ungar and Liebenberg 2011), juvenile delinquency (e.g. Stevens et al. 2011), and public health (e.g. Acosta et al. 2018). It is not our intention to review this entire literature. Rather, we focus on documentation available in regard to resilience in the face of polarization, radicalization and violent extremism, with a specific focus on youth. The recurrence of resilience in the PVE and CVE literature is notable but not surprising. After all, it ‘sits more easily with those most often charged with carrying out the work of PVE (teachers, social workers, youth workers) than explicitly security-driven concepts such as flagging risks’ (Stephens et al. 2019: 9).

Before we can go into more detail, it is important to observe that the resilience literature addresses resilience as a phenomenon of different “orders”, so to speak. In other words, it is a layered concept that works at different levels. Initially, resilience in the context of radicalization and PVE/CVE was solely understood as an individual matter concerning traits, skills, characters, personalities, emotions, (cap)abilities, attitudes, aptitudes and other individualized notions. However, gradually, it was acknowledged that a singular focus on individual qualities runs the risk of decontextualizing and depoliticizing the notion of resilience (Stephens et al. 2019: 10): it expects the individual mindset ‘to adapt to fit the existing order rather than questioning [that order] and seeking to effect change’. In the famous words of C. Wright Mills (1959), such an approach draws attention towards the sphere of “private troubles” and away from “public issues”.

In response, individual perspectives were complemented with socio-ecological perspectives to take into account higher order forms of resilience, differently invoked with words such as “context”, “structure”, “institution”, “environment” or “setting”. These all attempt to convey that what happens with people (intrapsychically and interpersonally) is co-determined or governed by some larger entity, arrangement, scheme or organizational form. Resilience also needs to feature on the level of these higher-order phenomena, lest it becomes the victim of “psychologism” (Wright Mills 1959). New developments in the field of resilience research have actually called attention to the interaction between individual and systemic dimensions, and to the processes, trajectories and resources that people can tap into (rather than the traits that people *have*).

In their recently published PVE literature review, Stephens et al. (2019) take an important step forward in this vertical differentiation and distinguish between (1) the resilient individual, (2) identity, (3) dialogue and action and (4) connected or resilient communities. Although this categorization has its merits (e.g. forcing the reader to consider resilience on different levels), we have opted for more consistent categories: individual resilience, community resilience, and societal resilience³. In the following subsections, we will review trends in the literature with respect to the various priorities, programs and partnerships that have come into being to stimulate these three forms of resilience.

Lessons learned

Recent studies resulted in renewed preventive approaches in combatting radicalization, questioning the validity of the approaches of their predecessors.

- First of all, a negative causal relationship between radicalization and security approaches is identified. Continuously emphasizing risky elements provokes feelings of alienation.
- Secondly, public health approaches are looking for sources in conditions, rather than characteristics of individuals or groups where it concerns 'abnormality'. Their frameworks work with resilience as a starting point and promote a more positive approach. The focus is on the talents of individuals, the so-called protective and promotive factors.

Preventive approaches with a singular focus on target groups can have the unintended effect of alienation and exclusion, undermining the inclusivity. Advocates of new wave preventive approaches are allied in the vision that investments in resilience are needed, calling policymakers to seek better connection in layered approaches.

3Ps for individual resilience

Individual resilience refers to the 'process of, capacity for, or outcome of successful adaptation despite challenging or threatening circumstances' that an individual person is facing (Masten, Best and Garmezy 1990: 426). In the context of PVE/CVE, such circumstances are many and diverse, ranging from broad socio-political developments (such as polarization) to circumstance closer to the individual youth (e.g. the absence of resources that may help youth to acquire certain socio-cognitive abilities to question black-and-white thinking or to develop the kind of self-esteem that is needed to stand up against strong ideologies). In the literature, various initiatives and (suggestions for) partnerships can be found in which different dimensions of the individual are prioritized, such as self-esteem, empathy, agency, perspective taking, value pluralism, moral engagement, or (digital) literacy.

A first example of a program designed to enhance resilience in individuals to prevent (violent) radicalization is the *DIAMANT* resilience training, developed in the Netherlands. This training was developed to train Muslim youth in the Netherlands who feel disadvantaged because of their ethnicity or religion (cf. Feddes, Mann and Doosje 2015, who conducted a longitudinal evaluation of this training)⁴. Certified DIAMANT trainers with a pedagogical

³ We have opted for the term "societal resilience" instead of "social resilience" because, obviously, individual resilience and community resilience are social as well. With "individual", "community" and "societal" we refer to the different orders (micro, meso and macro) of resilience.

⁴ The training was developed by the Dutch foundation *Interculturele Participatie en Integratie* (Kennisplatform Integratie en Samenleving 2017a).

background, who are all trained for two years themselves, provide the training. DIAMANT began in 2010, and in 2017, more than 500 Muslim youngsters were trained in various Dutch municipalities (Kennisplatform Integratie & Samenleving 2017a). In 2013 the training was subjected to academic scrutiny (as part of the EU project SATIRE) and found to have positive effects on youths' self-esteem, trust in others, empathy and participation (ibid).

The training consists of three modules that together take three months: Turning Point, Intercultural Moral Judgment, and Intercultural Conflict Management. In Turning Point, the first module, the youngsters work together with the trainer on their own identity development as well as on how to accept others who think differently. This part mainly addresses the youngsters' self-consciousness (Kennisplatform Integratie & Samenleving 2017a). In the other two modules, participants mainly work on empathy (e.g. the capacity and to understand and respond to the unique affective experiences of others) and perspective taking (e.g. the cognitive ability to anticipate the behavior and reactions of others). More specifically

participants reflect on their own opinions about what is "good" and "bad" behavior in comparison to what is acceptable behavior in society as a whole. For example possible disagreements between their religious standards and generally accepted behavior in Dutch society are discussed, such as alcohol consumption and the role of females in society. Participants are taught to think critically about their own and other's behavior and how to deal best with potential conflicts. (Feddes et al. 2015: 402).

The most important aim of the training is to enhance youngsters' self-esteem, agency, perspective taking and empathy in order to empower them and make them resilient to the temptation of extremist ideas and polarized thinking. Interestingly, Feddes et al. (2015) found a *curvilinear association* between self-esteem and youngsters' attitudes and their attitudes toward ideology-based violence: a moderate level of self-esteem correlates positively with resilience to violent radicalization, while too high levels of self-esteem (bordering on narcissism) can 'make individuals more susceptible to radicalization' (ibid: 407).

Although the authors of this evaluation study do not reflect on the implications of this curvilinear relationship for the sort of pedagogical alliances that we have discussed above, a few remarks may be made. First of all, it makes sense to argue that the different parties with a pedagogical relationship to youngsters (e.g. parents, teachers, youth workers) ought to coordinate their various efforts to boost youngsters' self-esteem in order not to overdo it. This asks for a constructive alignment and frequent intervision for the various partners to monitor the various measures and interventions that are in place to work on a youngster's self-esteem.

Second, it may be advised to focus more on interpersonal than intrapsychic aspects, as the relationships between perspective taking and empathy on the one hand and attitudes toward ideology-based violence on the other hand were found to be linearly negative. So the question arises: how can frontline pedagogues (teachers, youth workers, etc.) help youngsters to understand the affective experiences and anticipate the behavior of others?

One avenue worth exploring is the introduction of a mentor in the life of youth at risk, to strengthen the capacities of youth to develop and maintain interpersonal relationships. A mentor may be searched for in the informal network of the youngster (see Kleinjan 2018) but also in the formal network. With respect to the second, the ideal situation seems to be that the establishment of a mentorship occurs cross-sectionally, so that, for instance a teacher links his pupil to a youth worker or vice versa⁵. This connection could serve as a good antidote to the "professional loneliness" that many professionals in the pedagogical field struggle with when it comes to PVE/CVE (Azough 2017, more below).

⁵ Were "his", "him" or "he" are written, "her" or "she" can be read as well.

The introduction of a mentor, who can become a role model for youth, aligns well with the earlier mentioned discovery in the pedagogical sciences, i.e. that the 'affiliation with a radical organization is often driven by the need of adolescents and young adults for... a sense of kinship as a substitute for troubled family ties' (Sieckelinck and de Winter 2015: 6). A mentor, in other words, can become a preferable substitute for an unwanted substitute with dark intensions. In the context of PVE/CVE, little is known about what specific criteria would have to be met by a mentor, but Kleinjan (2018) has found reason to believe that mentors are an important asset in PVE/CVE initiatives.

Kleinjan studied the so-called JIM approach (standing for *Jouw Ingebrachte Mentor*, freely translated as Your Preferred Mentor), which was developed and implemented in 2012 by Youké, a youth care organization operational in various provinces of the Netherlands. JIM is offered as an alternative for intramural treatment of youth (aged 12-23) who experience multiple and complex problems in their lives. Kleinjan indeed found that mentors can serve as a role model that help youngsters to step down on the "staircase to terrorism" (Moghaddam's metaphor is used by Kleinjan). Mentorship may help youth to (re)discover what it means to build an empathic relationship with others. Moreover, mentors can establish a relationship of *trust* with youth and, based on that trust, forward them to other professionals in the youth or security domain, if deemed necessary. This way, mentors can foster institutional trust on the basis of personal trust—a potential of which the importance should not be underestimated, since distrust in institutions is often pointed at as an important risk factor in the context of PVE/CVE.

Although it was written six years earlier than Kleinjan's text, Spalek and Davies (2012) is a more advanced piece of work on mentoring in relation to violent extremism. Working on a mentoring scheme in the West Midlands region in the United Kingdom, Spalek and Davies argue that mentoring around violent extremism carries distinctive features and thus should be distinguished from mentoring in, for instance, the areas of criminal behavior or substance abuse. There are generic considerations (e.g. building a relationship, trust, or confidentiality), but these take on new meaning in the context of PVE/CVE, in which very specific knowledge is needed of issues such as polarization and the wide variety of extremist ideals and behaviors (covering areas such as anti-Semitism, islamophobia, right-wing extremism, anti-globalism, left-wing extremism, jihadism, etc.). This is why the recruitment of mentors in the informal networks of youth at risk (the focus of Kleinjan's work) is arguably less preferable than recruitment in formal networks where there is, or should we say "should be", more room for professionalization and institutionalization of knowledge. We will come back to this under the rubric of "community resilience".

One of the theories that Spalek and Davies (2012) engage with is disengagement theory, which offers a bridge to another series of initiatives that have come into being to foster individual resilience in the face of polarization and radicalization—initiatives that also centre on interpersonal aspects such as empathy and perspective taking⁶. One of the best works available on the notion of disengagement is an article by Aly, Taylor, and Karnovsky (2014), titled *Moral Disengagement and Building Resilience to Violent Extremism: An Educational Intervention*. The authors define moral disengagement as 'a psychological process through which self-regulatory mechanisms of internal control are disengaged or dismissed', resulting in a loss of moral agency that normally allows people to refrain from behaving inhumanly (ibid: 374). It goes without saying that moral disengagement is a risk factor to engaging in violent extremism, and the educational intervention that is discussed by Aly et al. (2014)—the Beyond Bali Educational Resource—is developed precisely to combat moral disengagement in young people.

⁶ We consider the relation between mentorship and disengagement so obvious, that we are not going to dwell upon it here.

Beyond Bali was funded by the Australian Government's Building Community Resilience Grant of the Federal Attorney General's Department and is a five module program for schools designed to 'build social cognitive resilience to violent extremism by engaging self-sanctions and preparing students to challenge the influence of violent extremism that can lead to moral disengagement' (ibid: 369). The intervention revolves around the important insight that mechanisms of moral disengagement (through which individuals justify violence, dehumanize victims, become indifferent to the consequences of violence, and absolve themselves of blame) are fundamental to violent extremist narratives. Beyond Bali was piloted in 2012 and distributed thereafter to government and private schools throughout Australia, where the intervention aims at 15-16-year-olds.

The main goal of the intervention is to 'build personal resilience by developing the self-regulatory function of young people [and immunize] young people against the ideological influences of violent extremism' (ibid: 372). It does so by confronting young students with real examples of terrorism, starting with the Bali Bombing in October 2002, which led to 202 lethal casualties, including 88 Australians. The five modules of Beyond Bali guide 'students progressively through five stage of engagement, empathy, moral reasoning and mindfulness, problem solving, and creative resolution using the context of the Bali bombings', and each module links to the Australian Curriculum so that subjects are discussed that are already part of students' daily work (ibid: 379). The module titles give away much of their content: Module 1: *The Australia-Bali connection: An introduction to our shared history*, Module 2: *Peace and conflict in Bali and the world: Understanding terrorism through our experiences with recent terrorist actions*, Module 3: *These are moral dilemmas: Making "good" decisions*, Module 4: *The Bali Peace Park in context* and Module 5: *Thoughts into actions: Creating your own park*.

With an astonishing width and depth, the various modules deal with the geography, history and culture of Bali and its connections to Australia, the impact of the attacks in both countries, the socially divisive effects of terrorism (and how empathy can serve as a counterweight), moral dilemmas on the basis of real life examples of survivors and their families, the function of peace parks across the globe, and the creation of an imaginary peace park as an authentic learning experience whereby students learn to bring theory into practice.

The fact that Beyond Bali has been rolled out across Australia is a strong indication of its success. Here we have an educational intervention that seems to enjoy widespread legitimacy because of its nuanced, balanced and delicate approach and because it brings to life important ideals in multicultural education: constructivism, critical pedagogy, inclusive curricula, individual and collaborative decision-making, and the usage of ethical dilemmas to boost moral agency. Although Beyond Bali is very much bound up with the Australasian context, its philosophy is transferable to other contexts. In the form of grassroots initiatives, schools can connect to local events or events in the region and be inspired by the Beyond Bali program to discuss such events in class, spontaneously or systematically.

Again, not much attention has been paid in this article to the role that pedagogical alliances can play in educational interventions like this, but the opportunities for partnerships are visible to the naked eye. Beyond Bali is a realistic program in the sense that it draws real-life situations into the classroom (including eye witness reports, family trauma's, survivor's accounts). For teachers across the world to develop and teach Beyond Bali-like programs, whether or not they are as comprehensive and well-planned or more ad hoc, they need to rely on frontline professionals who can "bring in" that kind of information. This requires collaboration with youth workers, social workers and other professionals who are ideally suited to do so. Recent examples such as the white supremacist attacks in Christchurch, New-Zealand (March 2019) or the tram shooting in Utrecht, the Netherlands (also March 2019), should mobilize frontline workers towards partnerships with schools and other learning environments.

Not that Beyond Bali is one of a kind. More examples can be found that convey the same message and work in similar ways. There is a homology, for instance, between Beyond

Bali and the value complexity prevention method Being Muslim Being British (BMBB) in the UK. This method seeks to enable participants to ‘maximize a wider range of their own values as a means to increase their complexity of thinking about issues of potential cleavage between Muslim and British-western identities’ (Liht and Savage 2013: 44). Such complexity makes youth less vulnerable to the kind of black-and-white thinking typical of extremist ideologies. BMBB was funded by the European Commission and the UK Home Office and targets young people of 16 years and older. It is a multi-media course in which participants are confronted with a wide array of Muslim viewpoints from the extreme right to the extreme left and middle positions. The course consists of three “steps of transformation”: differentiation, value pluralism, and integration. In their conclusions, Liht and Savage state that the initial findings of their evaluation study are promising. BMBB’s method (more details can be found in the referenced source) of exposing youth to a multiplicity of value priorities led to a greater range of values in youth and a higher complexity of their thinking; outcomes that are known to predict pro-social rather than violent ways of conflict management.

Whereas Beyond Bali and BMBB both emphasize Muslim youth and fundamentalism, the Dutch campaign *Dare to be Grey* takes a broader perspective. Like the Australian and British initiatives, it seeks to contribute to the ability of youth (but now all youth) to think in a more complex and nuanced way about the world in which they live, in order to counter black-and-white schemes and concomitant extreme ideals, and to stimulate critical thinking. Looking back at our earlier discussion of public health and pedagogical policies, the generic focus in *Dare to be Grey* seems to be a better fit.

Dare to be Grey was developed by 21 students of Utrecht University, who won the international competition *Peer 2 Peer: Challenging Extremism* (2016) that was sponsored by the US State Department and Facebook. Importantly, this campaign, which has now become a national phenomenon in the Netherlands, is a campaign by and for youth (Kennisplatform Integratie & Samenleving 2017b). In that capacity, it has a lower risk of being considered condescending or top-down. Such initiatives should be embraced locally by pedagogical alliances, as peer-to-peer education is discovered as a new field in PVE/CVE (more below)⁷. *Dare to be Grey* is an open initiative, set up by a group of young people who encourage their peers across the country to join in and develop local *Dare to be Grey* meetings. Youth workers, for example, could organize such meetings in schools, i.e. an environment that may be experienced as safer by youngsters than public places in the city where, due to all kinds of contingencies, it is more difficult to guarantee an atmosphere that stimulates dialogue and open-mindedness.

⁷ On this matter, numerous publications have appeared that deliver critique on state education in the context of PVE/CVE (e.g. Akbarzadeh 2013; Davies 2016; O’Donnell 2017). Davies and O’Donnell both warn for the social effects of state-initiated CVE initiatives in the field of education, such as the UK Prevent strategy, which may be perceived as an extension of state surveillance networks or state pedagogy. Akbarzadeh reflects on state efforts in Australia to sponsor “moderate Islam”. Although this approach, which seeks to develop counter-ideologies to Islamism, has had some success, it ‘neglects the broader context of Muslim experience which is marked by socio-economic under-privilege and political alienation’ (p. 451). Such state-initiated efforts fail to take into account the notion of societal resilience that lies at the heart of this issue (more below).

Lessons learned

PVE programs such as DIAMANT, JIM, and Beyond Bali provide insight into the practical usability of the concept of resilience in preventive strategies. In their approaches, they allocate an important role for pedagogical actors in fostering one's self-esteem.

- This requires from the professionals intensive availability and an evident degree of bearing capacities. One way of doing this is via the introduction of a mentor who can guide and monitor the processes of youth at risk. They could serve as bridge builders. Also, the established bonds of trust with youth will be useful in cooperation possibilities with other domains in follow-up programs. Given the proposed nature and the conditions that apply, it is, however, a challenge to hire suitable mentors. In the academic world opinions differ as to where (formal or informal networks) to search for mentors.

Beyond the guidance of mentors, another methodological solution appears to be sought in educative programs, such as Beyond Bali. Such programs concentrate on increasing knowledge and understanding, for instance through education in critical thinking and by raising awareness on core values.

3Ps for community resilience

So far we have discussed various priorities, programs and (potential) partnerships that are likely to foster individual resilience in the face of polarization and radicalism, covering a wide range of targets including empathy, perspective taking, (moral) agency, empowerment, self-esteem, moral engagement, mentorship, critical thinking, value complexity and pluralism, mutual decision-making, and "greyness". All of these are important and necessary but not *sufficient* to pave the road to resilience. As stated before, a singular focus on individual resilience would imply that youngsters are individually responsible for their success or failure to become immune to extreme ideals, regardless of the context in which they (are) live(d). So, let us take resilience to the next level.

Community resilience is commonly defined as a 'process linking a set of networked adaptive capacities to a positive trajectory of functioning and adaptation' in the face of adversity (Norris et al. 2008: 131). So, rather than being about an individual's capacity, community resilience is about how different members of a community jointly gain the adaptive capacities to follow a positive path on negative territory. A key word in the community resilience literature is for instance "collective efficacy": 'social cohesion combined with a willingness to take action on behalf of the broader community' (Ellis and Abdi 2017: 290). Much has been written about how such social cohesion comes about. Based on the social capital literature, Ellis and Abdi (2017) distinguish three types of social connections: social bonds, social bridges and social links (see Table 1).

Social connections that contribute to community resilience	Risk factors for violent extremism addressed by social bonds	Examples of how communities can promote resilience
Bonds: sense of belonging and connection with others who are similar	Weak social identity, searching for belonging and meaningful identity	Support for ethnic-based community organizations promoting community self-help
Bridging: sense of belonging and connection with people who are dissimilar in important ways	Social marginalization, lack of identification with or attachment to nation	Community-wide/school-based antibullying/youth mentoring programming
Linking: connections and equal partnership across vertical power differentials, e.g., government and communities	Lack of trust, lack of collaboration and equal access to resources, systems that lack the knowledge to serve/engage communities	Establishing advisory boards or multidisciplinary team with community membership

Table 1. Types of Social Connection and How They Relate to Community Resilience and Violent Extremism

Source: Ellis and Abdi (2017: 290)

As table 1 makes clear, social bonding and bridging are horizontal phenomena, whereby bonding refers to within-community connections (between people who are similar) and bridging refers to connections across communities (between people who are dissimilar). Social linking, on the other hand, is a vertical phenomenon that concerns the connections between communities and more powerful agents (e.g. governmental institutions).

Although Ellis and Abdi (2017) centre their article on communal groups (e.g. ethnic groups, geographically determined groups), they make it clear that “community” can mean many different things: ‘social psychology has emphasized the importance of the relational aspects of community—the ways in which one’s perception of similarity to others or belongingness can provide a psychological sense of community’ (p. 291). Considering our focus on pedagogical alliances, we want to explore below what happens when we draw organizational communities such as school communities or youth work organizations into our orbit. What kind of bonding, bridging and linking do *they* need in order to gain resilience in the face of polarization and radicalism?

Let us begin with within-community connections, i.e. with social bonding. In preceding parts of our text, we have already hinted at the importance of strong ties within organizational communities such as youth work organizations and school communities. If strong ties are absent, knowledge on polarization and radicalization cannot be transferred and becomes “private property,” so to speak. We gave the example of “hyperhermeneutic” teachers who, due to a lack of knowledge and experience, tend to over-interpret every sign of abnormality among Muslim youngsters as signs of radicalization (Hoppenbrouwers et al. 2019). The Dutch example does not stand alone. When she attended a briefing meeting by the UK Office for Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) on the new Prevent Guidance, Lynn Davies of Birmingham University heard Muslim participants talk about their ‘children being fearful to speak freely in class in case they were seen as making jihadi comments’ (Davies 2016: 6). Such moving accounts emphasize the importance of harnessing and enhancing social bonds within professional communities, in order to combat the knowledge deficit that persists in this field. Most of the notions touched upon above (perspective taking, empathy, critical thinking, value pluralism, greyness, etc.) are precisely the kind of qualities that pedagogical professionals should have too.

This holds true for youth work organizations as much as for school communities. The title of the article by van de Weert and Eijkman (2018) is revealing in this regard: *Subjectivity in detection of radicalisation and violent extremism: A youth worker’s perspective*. The authors of this article argue that youth workers in the Netherlands are trained to increase their knowledge of polarization and radicalization issues, yet remain “insufficiently equipped” to assess and act upon potential risks in youth. As a result, individual perceptions and intuitions rather than evidence-based criteria determine the course of action (or inaction) that is taken⁸. Van de Weert and Eijkman provide two explanations: (1) preventive work is destined to lack a legal basis (as it takes place in a “pre-crime space”), which automatically means that wide discretion is available to the frontline professionals involved and (2) Dutch municipalities are free to choose the kind of training they offer to youth workers. Consequently, the contents, duration and quality of the trainings differ from one municipality to another, which has led to different knowledge bases in different parts of the country. Depending on how far we stretch

⁸ A similar problem occurs in another professional organization that seems to be perpetually struggling with the tension between evidence-based decision-making, procedural regularity and protocol on the one hand and discretionary authority, street knowledge and intuition on the other: the Dutch police (cf. Mutsaers 2019a).

the borders of the youth workers' community, this is a problem of social bonding: do we consider local youth work organizations communities or do we prefer to think of youth work in the Netherlands as a community (led by the youth workers association BVJong, for example)? A more practical question that needs to be addressed in the future, is: how can social bonding be enhanced within the youth work community (or communities) in order to make knowledge of, experience with and ideas about polarization and radicalization available and transferrable?

Professional communities such as schools and youth worker organizations tasked with PVE/CVE do not have to start from scratch of course. An increasing stock of knowledge is already freely circulating and can be tapped into by these communities in order to increase *their own* resilience. Here we would like to concentrate on two authoritative documents; one published by the European Commission (2017), *The contribution of youth work to preventing marginalisation and violent radicalisation*, and one published by the RAN Centre of Excellence (2018), *Transforming schools into labs for democracy: A companion to preventing violent radicalisation through education*⁹.

The RAN policy paper on schools as labs for democracy banks on the idea that Professor Richardson, the vice chancellor of the University of Oxford, spoke of at the British Council's Going Global conference in London (in 2015): 'Any terrorist I have ever met through my academic work had a highly over simplified view of the world, which they saw in black and white terms. Education robs you of that simplification and certitude. Education is the best possible antidote to radicalisation' (British Council 2015; Macaluso 2016: 7). The RAN publication is rich with examples of best practices that aid school communities in becoming resilient and empowered to "rob" youth of simplified ideas about the world. In other words, it provides content to the social bonds that ought to be strengthened within school communities. This content is divided over three sections: I. In the school, II. Empowering teachers and schools, and III. Thinking ahead: Policy recommendations in the face of emerging challenges.

Section I is divided into six best practices, some of which are more specific than others. *Promoting democratic ethos* is the most generic strategy, the 'oxygen the school requires before it can serve as a laboratory for democracy' (RAN 2018: 11). In line with Dewey's democratic ethos, a democratic school ethos boosts resilience against polarizing and extremist narratives by stipulating human rights values, pluralism and freedom. In order for teachers to embody this ethos, they need to know how to turn school into a safe space where sensitive issues, extreme ideals and conflicts are out in the open, available for discussion rather than censorship. *Nurturing diversity* serves to counter rigid and exclusive identity constructs. Extremist ideologies revolve around such identities (promoting "authenticity", "purity" or "ultimate truths"), but so do ethnocentric school curricula that fail to address global history approaches (going beyond history confined to national borders), (post)colonial power relations, world system theory, the risks and challenges of globalization, and the positive sides of multiculturalism. There is an abundance of literature on multicultural education and inclusive curricula available for teachers to draw on (e.g. Banks and McGee Banks 2016 for multiple perspectives) to prevent that schools become a fertile breeding ground for extremist ideas. *Tackling discrimination* is a third best practice mentioned in the RAN policy paper. It is well known that grievances and feelings of exclusion and injustice fuel radicalism and extremism. In addition to the risks of curricular discrimination mentioned above, discrimination can become a daily interactional problem between students or students and teachers. Teaching 'provides various opportunities to acknowledge and address discrimination and exclusion and to enable

⁹ RAN stands for Radicalisation Awareness Network and its Centre of Excellence is the European 'hub and platform to exchange experience, pool knowledge, identify best practices and develop new initiatives in tackling radicalisation' (European Commission 2017: 43).

youngsters to address related experiences and emotions' (RAN 2018: 14). For instance, teachers can inform students of their legal rights to take action against discrimination.

Fostering media literacy is a fourth best practice and an important part of media education in school to enhance students' and pupils' 21st century skills. It is important to realize that in this world, young people are "digital natives" whereas members of the older generation (teachers) are "digital immigrants" (Prensky 2009). Put differently, for young people, the online environment is the natural habitat in which they are growing up. Enhancing digital literacy (as McNicol 2016 calls it) thus has to start with teachers, so that *they* know how to assist students in understanding the meaning and function of trolls, algorithms, fake news, extremist propaganda online, etc. (we will argue below that this, again, can be a promising partnership between school teachers and youth workers, as the latter may be more experienced in this field). *Building religious literacy* is the fifth best practice mentioned in the RAN text: 'Experts on radicalisation agree that a lack of understanding of diverse religions and the various ways they can be practiced renders students vulnerable to indoctrination and recruitment, and fosters polarised and exclusive patterns of identity' (RAN 2018: 15). This means that teachers should be capable of providing interreligious education that exposes students to various religious and philosophical schools and encourage interfaith dialogue. But it also means, or so we argue, that teachers *need to know* that radicalisation is more than jihadism. In the policy world as well as the literature, including some of the referenced texts above, we still see a dominant focus on Muslim radicalisation and extremism. This bias itself may become a fertile breeding ground for the vicious circle in which Islamism and Islamophobia get caught up and feed on each other. Finally, *Peers as facilitators and experts* is a best practice centered on peer-education: 'Processes of radicalisation often involve group dynamics among peers; most people who have been radicalised are part of small groups of youngsters and young adults sharing interests, concerns and experiences.....[p]eer education approaches [can be] used in prevention work, involving youngsters and young adults to initiate debates on sensitive topics such as identity, religiosity or discrimination' (RAN 2018: 15-16). The Dare to be Grey initiative that we mentioned above is a good example and should, following RAN, be better used in the school context.

Parts II and III of the RAN policy paper advice, as we did in our various comments on the six best practices, that teachers should be better trained so that they can become the embodied examples of the best practices they teach students: Teachers must, for example, 'contend with new technologies but also with new phenomena such as fake news, hoaxes and conspiracy theories distributed in social media'. And, we should add, they must do so as a community rather than as private persons with particular interests, lest they feel cut off, alone and incapable, that is, suffer from the "professional loneliness" mentioned above.

In addition to training schemes, school administrators and policy makers who establish procedures that staff can follow once a case of radicalisation comes to the surface, greatly assist teachers who may otherwise feel like groping in the dark. This harks back to the discussion above on youth workers' subjectivity (van de Weert and Eijkman 2018): protocols are needed in order to keep professionals from swimming in an ocean of subjectivities (and thus doubts). This is not to argue that protocols can rule out doubt (radicalization processes are too complex to be ever handled with certitude) but they can help professionals to at least get a grip on the situation.

Finally, curriculum development should not, and cannot, be left to teachers' own creative discretion. Teachers undoubtedly play an important role, but curriculum development is also a higher-order process in which both school administrators as well as higher-level administrators (e.g. at the state or national level) are involved. In the end, curriculum development is a matter of representation (and the politics of representation): it is in curricula and textbooks that social realities and educational needs are reflected (or not). This requires of school administrators that they keep searching for and deploying resources that allow

teachers to work with inclusive curricula and teaching materials. Furthermore, it requires political action to do so (RAN 2018), but that is our concern in the next section.

On to the European Commission (2017) toolbox and recommendations for youth work. The entire document is written around the distinction between (1) generic or primary prevention, (2) targeted or secondary prevention, and (3) indicated or tertiary prevention, which asks for the uptake of different roles and tasks by youth workers. Generic prevention squares well with the public health and pedagogical approaches as discussed above, considering its focus on youth in general. Generic prevention boils down to any intervention deployed to keep youth on the right track and away from hazardous thinking and action. Targeted prevention 'aims to reach young people who show tendencies towards or are interested in anti-democratic, extremist ideologies (or fragments of these ideologies) and propaganda, are close to extremist groups or have already been in contact with such groups' (European Commission 2017: 6). Indicated prevention, finally, targets 'young people who are already engaged in an extremist group and want to drop out' (ibid: 6). It is stated that indicated prevention should only be carried out by experts or youth workers who are especially trained for it. The tasks for and expectation of youth workers at each level are many, too many to be discussed in detail here, so we have given an overview in Table 2.

Two observations are important for now. First, many resemblances can be spotted between the prevention tasks of teachers and youth workers, which makes them interesting "partners in crime prevention". Like teachers, youth workers are to be given an important role in discussing sensitive issues and taboo topics, providing counter narratives based on human rights and pluralism, developing a genuine interest in the life worlds of youth, organizing intercultural and interfaith conversations, bringing anti-discrimination networks to the attention of youth, encourage value complexity, etc. Second, the European Commission work group, just like the RAN Centre of Excellence, recognizes the importance of the professionalization of youth worker organizations (i.e. of social bonding, in social capital jargon) to enable them to carry out all these important tasks.

Generic prevention, youth workers should:

- ✓ Be the mediators and facilitators when discussing difficult topics or topics they are not familiar with
- ✓ Discuss questions of meaning with young people in a safe environment
- ✓ Dare to discuss taboo topics
- ✓ Know the trends, dare to confront them, tune in to young people's reality
- ✓ Enable young people to understand human rights and democratic values in practice
- ✓ Be aware of their values and implicit identity. Assess their own ability for self-reflection, critical thinking and emotional resilience
- ✓ Encourage intercultural and inter-faith discussions which underscore common values
- ✓ Make best use of existing training opportunities on processes of violent radicalisation
- ✓ Provide positive narratives to counter extremist ideologies
- ✓ Inform young people of public anti-discrimination network

Targeted prevention, youth workers should:

- ✓ Be aware when young people cut off bonds with their social groups. It could be a sign of violent radicalisation.
- ✓ Try to identify the signals and assess them correctly. They are often a cry for attention.
- ✓ Establish/build up a trustful relationship before confronting ideological issues
- ✓ Work with the mind-set
- ✓ Know the scenery and be ready to intervene on site
- ✓ Use peer education activities to prevent young people from getting more involved in extremist circles
- ✓ Find out about young people's motives and reasons for joining extremism and develop strategies and social initiatives
- ✓ Create space for and get involved in dialogue. Train in dialogue facilitation techniques
- ✓ Familiarise on the processes and dynamics of violent radicalisation and of propaganda as well as on motives and attractions
- ✓ Get to know the role of the symbols in extremist groups. It will help to approach young people from these groups.
- ✓ Engage in dialogue: listen to young people's positions and demonstrate a democratic and humanistic point of view
- ✓ Establish co-operation with other stakeholders such as NGOs, schools, justice, security and social institutions

Indicated prevention, youth workers should:

- ✓ Build a trusting bond with young people they are working with
- ✓ Be sure that they can meet the challenges before intervening
- ✓ Form alliances with key figures in the community
- ✓ Understand the process, work on the causes and develop alternatives
- ✓ Approach the family, get to know its dynamics and seek the right person to get approval from before intervening
- ✓ Develop security protocols to ensure security for the young person and themselves

Table 2: Generic, targeted and indicated prevention. A practical toolbox for youth workers
Source: European Commission (2017)

Various suggestions are given: involve higher and middle management to secure their commitment to develop youth work in such a way that democratic resilience in youth can be boosted; provide training opportunities to youth workers on subjects such as conflict management and dialogue techniques; provide opportunities for youth workers to enhance their digital literacy; establish "helplines" and help desks where young people can sign up or call in for deradicalization and depolarization guidance; provide a wide-ranging list with useful resources which can be used by youth workers to keep their expertise up-to-date. These and many other suggestions that are given are crucial to harness and enhance social bonding within youth workers organizations and thus to boost community resilience.

Lessons learned

Social bonding basically comes down to the need for education in preventive approaches. To this effect, a policy paper of RAN (RAN 2018) refers to a number of best practice pillars: promoting democratic ethos, nurturing diversity, tackling discrimination, fostering media, literacy building, religious literacy and peers as facilitators and experts.

- In order to follow such a predefined route in the curriculum, educators themselves naturally require proper training.

In the same context, the European Commission (2017) provided a document, serving as a toolbox for youth work. The survey distinguishes between generic/primary prevention, targeted/secondary prevention and thirdly, targeted/tertiary prevention. The scope of the tasks linked to the functions of youth workers in each of these sections is mostly equal to the previously discussed teaching and working methods for educators.

- This ensures that they, educators and youth workers, in particular, are or should become key partners in preventing crime and radicalization.

Once again, with social bonding at its basis, the European Commission also highlights the importance of professionalization. Investing in social bonding is essential to increase and foster community resilience.

3Ps for societal resilience

At first sight, societal resilience appears to be an achievement that is beyond the control of the pedagogical alliances that we have in mind in this text. Societies that are largely immune to the (cognitive, social and political) temptations of polarization and radicalization typically are just societies with a fair distribution of rights, resources and opportunities and an engaged and democratic citizenry. These are matters of political economy and socio-cultural policy; i.e. broader social structures that transcend local initiatives and ties. However, from a socio-ecological and social capital perspective, some opportunities can be discovered for pedagogical alliances to gain agency and transform these social structures, albeit step-by-step and, likely, with many setbacks.

So far, we have solely addressed social *bonding*, that is, within-community connections and improvements that may help school communities and youth work organizations on their way in the crusade against polarization and radicalization. With regard to societal resilience, the other two notions (social *bridging* and *linking*) become more important. Questions rise, such as: how can professional communities strengthen their ties in order to work together on prevention (bridging) and how can they link to powerful agencies such as governmental institutions and local, regional or national levels (linking)? Interestingly, mentions are made throughout the literature (e.g. Azough 2017; European Commission 2017; Pels and de Ruyter 2012; RAN 2018; Sieckelinck and de Winter 2015; Sieckelinck 2017; Witte 2017) of the importance of such bridging and linking, albeit in a different wording, but we have hardly found any reliable descriptions of good partnership between for instance schools and youth work, or the social domain and the security domain, or between frontline professionals and government, in the area of prevention of polarization.

A few notable exceptions do exist, however. First, close to our home, there is the network *Sociale Onrust en Maatschappelijke Spanningen* (SOMS) in Tilburg, the Netherlands, which addresses social tensions and unrest in the municipality. This network consists of professionals in the domains of education, care, local government, security, sport, social work and more, who are all trained by youth workers employed by R-newt, the youth work

organization of ContourdeTwern. The training addresses polarization and its various breeding grounds in the city. In addition, R-newt aids other professionals in the network by means of practical meetings in which signals of radicalization can be discussed (Frissen and Janssen 2018). The main reason for doing so, was because R-newt had noticed that these signals are often very hard to detect and interpret and should therefore be subjected to multidisciplinary and cross-sectional consultation. Moreover, in the study by Frissen and Janssen it was found that often, signals only begin to make sense once information is added up that comes from different corners of the social domain.

Azough (2017) describes the Tilburg case as a good example because the network operates at different levels (i.e. meets the criteria of social bridging and linking). As can be seen in Figure 1, SOMS flexibly moves in and out of three different layers. The core consist of traditional repression methods (carried out by security actors), the mid-layer represents the broader network of professional organizations that exchange information and the outer layer represents the resilient society, characterized by tolerance and communities that feel supported by the network. This multi-level approach does not only mean that social bridging is made possible, but also that professional communities engage in 'equal partnership across vertical power differentials' (Ellis and Abdi 2017: 290); an important aspect of societal resilience. In her report on resilient youth and resilient professionals, Azough (2017) discusses at length the importance of equal partnership between frontline professionals such as teachers and youth workers and more powerful organizations:

One of the greatest obstacles to collaboration is that youth work organizations often lack an equal position in the network. The experience is that youth workers often pass on information (to the police, youth care), but hear nothing about what is being done with that information... Sometimes, shared information leads to tough action or even an arrest, without youth workers being informed. That can be damaging or even threatening to the position of the youth worker in the area. This can discourage youth workers to share information the next time (Azough 2017: 27, translated from the Dutch).

Such scenarios are more likely to be prevented in Tilburg due to the equal (and formalized) partnership between the police, R-newt, school communities and other partners.




Figure 1: SOMS network Tilburg
 Source: Azough (2017)

Another good partnership example that is often mentioned is the previously discussed Aarhus model in Denmark (e.g. Bertelsen 2015; Hemmingsen 2015)¹⁰. The Aarhus Model has programs for both early prevention, targeting youngsters in an early stage of radicalization, and exit processes, directed at already radicalized people who have the intention to commit politically and/or religiously motivated violent crimes (Bertelsen 2015). A theoretical framework, known as Life Psychology, supports the Aarhus Model. Life Psychology theory is based on three basic premises. In sum, the first premise is that everybody aspires to a "good-enough" life, the second that having a good-enough grip on life means coping well-enough with the tasks life offers, and the third premise is that all human beings, irrespective of gender, culture, ability, life history, etc. are confronted with the same fundamental life tasks (cf. Bertelsen 2015 for more details). When a human being is incapable or incapacitated to fulfill such fundamental life tasks, radicalization is lurking. The distinction that we make between *incapability* and *incapacitation* is an important one, because it reflects the recognition in Life Psychology of both individual and societal resilience in the face of polarization and radicalization. Put simply, interventions and programs flowing from Life Psychology ought to consider both the *feeling* of being deprived of equal chances to fulfill life tasks (an individual notion) as well as the *actual deprivation* (a social notion). The feeling of deprivation may make a person incapable of fulfilling life tasks, but if deprivation is actually happening, that is the *real* issue. Bertelsen: 'of course, in a wider societal perspective, it is not only about empowering the threatened individual. In the long run it is important to address the factors of exclusion and other [fundamental] threats, that is, to focus not only on agency but also on...structure' (2015: 251). Seeds are thus already planted in Life Psychology, and thus the Aarhus Model, that make it possible to scale up to societal resilience.

The Aarhus Model is well attuned to the three premises of Life Psychology. It is comprised of various initiatives (in all of which the municipality plays an important role), including the InfoHouse, mentoring, workshops, parent networks, dialogue sessions, an exit program, and education and supervision of staff. The InfoHouse is manned by police and social workers and it the first place where incoming information (from parents, teachers, youth workers, social workers, and so forth) on radicalization is being processed. Specific measure are taken when risk factors of violent radicalization are identified (ibid: 243):

The InfoHouse will initiate contact to brief the person on the reports and the assessment, and to explain about the concerns concerning the dangerous developmental trajectory and mindset. In addition, parts of the person's network (family, peers, school, clubs) will... be mobilized in the process of helping the person to acknowledge and seek alternative legal ways to find answers to questions of life, as well as alternative ways to resolve resentment and offence (personal as well as social or cultural).

"Legal" does not mean "juridical" but is juxtaposed to "illegal". An example of an alterative legal way is the mentoring scheme that is part of the Aarhus Model. In the mentor program, a youngster is connected to a mentor who is available 24/7 and trained to help the youth with all kinds of social problems, family issues, education, employment, after school activities, peer issues, and so on (Johansen forthcoming). Feelings of exclusion are specifically addressed. The mentor also brings to the youth's attention the personal and social dangers as well as the illegality and the immorality of the path that the mentee is tempted to take. Moreover, the

¹⁰ Although some scholars have been more critical (e.g. Johansen forthcoming, who warns for the risk of "diffuse policing" in which the boundaries of what should be policed and who should do the policing become blurred).

mentor is well informed about the political and religious questions in a youth's life and approaches these hands on, in order for the youth to talk about his ultimate life concerns (Bertelsen 2015). The mentor scheme is an example of "targeted prevention" in European Commission (2017) language; it targets individuals who already entered the path towards radicalization.

The workshops that are part of the Aarhus Model are an example of "generic prevention". These workshops are held at primary schools and high schools, where students and pupils learn about the dangers of violent radicalization and terrorism through presentations, dialogue sessions, exercises, games and role-plays (Bertelsen 2015). The workshops have two purposes. On the one hand, the aim is to increase vigilance in school communities to enhance the capacity for early detection and intervention. On the other hand, the workshops are designed to boost young people's resilience by making them aware of many of the issues that also feature in the RAN and European Commission texts discussed above: the risks of the internet, prejudice and exclusion; the benefits of engaged citizenship and participation in social life.

The Aarhus team takes similar initiatives in Muslim communities, where dialogue sessions are held in mosques to discuss possibilities to prevent violent radicalization of the younger members (as well as of right-wing radicals who develop their ideas in opposition to the mosque). Such dialogue sessions help to make sure that contact is already made before things go awry. When it does, parent networks are already in place to work together with parents of radicalized youth (both right-wingers and jihadists). These networks

[are] led by process facilitators from the staff of the Aarhus team, and [their] purpose is to empower the parents with parental skills regarding the specific challenges of having a violently radicalized child, as well as to empower parents to be resource persons in a united anti- and de-radicalization effort (Bertelsen 2015: 244)

Part of that united effort is an exit program for foreign fighters, initiated in 2013, which aims at the deradicalization of people who have returned. The purpose is to help homecoming people finding their way back into society. The person's social network (family, peers, school, work, etc.) is crucial in this respect. Specific services are in place, once the returnee has signed an exit-process cooperation agreement, to offer help with regard to education, employment, housing, counseling and therapy, as well as medical care ¹¹.

Finally, an important aspect of the Aarhus Model is a continuous training and supervision of its staff. All staff (the mentors, workshop instructors, network facilitators, etc.) have received comprehensive training on radicalization processes, risk factors, conflict management, coaching and Life Psychology ('especially to help train mentees in the development of fundamental life skills, including topics of group processes, identity-formation in youth, and cultural psychology') (Bertelsen 2015: 245).

What strikes us if we look at the Tilburg and Aarhus models is that the criteria of social bonding, bridging as well as linking are all largely met. Connections within professional communities, across professional communities, as well as between these communities and society at large (including government, but also ethnic groups, religious communities, political activists) are given serious attention. We begin to see how, slowly, such initiatives may not only improve the *agency* of individuals and communities but also the (*welfare*) *structures* that

¹¹ Obviously, certain conditions have to be met before the agreement can be offered to the returnee (e.g. the absence of a criminal record or ongoing prosecution process, a positive risk assessment, and a willingness to complete the exit process)

(co)determine the life changes of individuals and groups. *That is the key to societal resilience: vertical change.*¹²

Lessons learned

Tilburg (the Netherlands) and Aarhus (Denmark) provide examples of how the working concepts in resilience can be implemented in practice. Although societal resilience seems an intangible concept as to possibilities for interference, social bridging and linking even contribute to that process.

- The local SOMS network in Tilburg can be considered a good practice. This network meets the bridging and linking standards. What else makes this collaboration so unique is the multilevel approach, in which there is equal partnership across vertical power differentials. In this way, the collaboration combats the lack of equality for youth work in partnerships, which was marked as one of the main obstructions to successful network cooperation in preventing radicalization by Azough (2017).
- The Aarhus method contains a deradicalization program unique for its principles and theoretical elaboration in both individual resilience and societal resilience. This pedagogical program works with mentors, appropriate to a targeted approach of the European Commission. Along with the mentor, a large team of professionals move around the working method, who, in turn, are being trained and supervised consistently.

Following the proclaimed effectiveness of social bonding, bridging and linking, Tilburg and Aarhus appear to have developed sophisticated partnerships, both attempting to improve the agency of youth at risk and boosting societal resilience via improvements in (welfare) structures. As such, they aim at tackling both polarization in society as well as the radicalization of youth. Therefore, one of the main conclusions, indeed, is that we may strive for empowering youth, but it may be even more rewarding to address factors pushing youth towards radicalization.

Conclusions

We have written a large part of this report in a month (March 2019) in which people across the globe, but especially in New Zealand and the Netherlands, were once again shocked by two terrorist attacks. In Christchurch, a 28-year-old white supremacist shot dead 50 people and wounded dozens more in two consecutive attacks at mosques (the Al Noor Mosque and the Linwood Islamic Centre) in the city. Three days later, on March 18, the Turkish-born Gokmen T. engaged in what appears to be a random shooting in a tram in Utrecht, killing four people and wounding six more.

T. was already a known figure in the Dutch criminal justice system since 2012, which has raised questions in the Netherlands about the effectiveness of criminal justice actors when it comes to preventing and countering radicalization and violent extremism. Such questions are legitimate, we argue, and touch upon the important issue whether or not security actors can be held solely responsible for the execution of PVE/CVE work.

In this article we have come a long way to argue that they cannot. First, we have summarized important trends in the policy world of deradicalization and depolarization, from

¹² For another example of "vertical change", see McDonald (2011) who writes about the role of Muslim Youth Workers in the UK, who act as important intermediaries linking Muslim communities and the British state in new, more progressive ways.

security approaches to public health approaches and pedagogical approaches, to make a case for the latter two. Subsequently, we drew important lines from these two approaches to the priorities, programs and partnership that they imply and call for. We argued that the priority should be to develop resilience in the face of polarization and radicalization at three levels: the individual, community and societal level. Only when we achieve both horizontal and vertical change (i.e. social bonding, bridging *and* linking), we can stop trying to empty the ocean with a thimble. In other words, whereas individual and community resilience are important outcomes of PVE/CVE work, we must certainly not forget to work on societal resilience, lest we only expect individuals and communities to adapt to fit the existing order without question that order itself.

A three-level approach requires intense collaboration between individual youth, citizen communities, professional communities and government agencies. Throughout the literature we have come across dozens of calls to mobilize such partnerships (some of which have not been referenced to because of the sheer size of this literature), but actual descriptions of such partnerships are rare. We have provided a few to help advance this field.

In addition, we have given numerous suggestions to develop lines along which partnerships can be forged. These vary from fine-tuned and coordinated efforts by parents, teachers and youth workers to boost youngsters' self-esteem, to partnerships between teachers and youth workers in mentor schemes, to dialogue sessions on "greyness" organized by youth workers in schools, to the introduction of Muslim Youth Workers as intermediaries between ethnic groups and states, to Beyond Bali-like programs in which frontline workers provide real life materials to educators (a Beyond Christchurch intervention immediately springs to mind), or digital literacy trainings in schools by youth workers who themselves are "digital natives", born and raised in an online environment, so to speak.

The relevance of this kind of work is indisputable. As we are finalizing our conclusions, the latest report of the Dutch SCP (the bureau for social and cultural planning) lies on our desks. Its main conclusion: polarization is once again on the rise in the Netherlands (SCP 2019).

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